Tomlin's game management doesn't add up

By Mike Prisuta
TRIBUNE-REVIEW
Monday, January 7, 2008



Steelers quarterback Ben Roethlisberger walks from the field after a 31-29 loss to Jacksonville Saturday night, Jan. 5, 2008 at Heinz Field.
Christopher Horner/TRIBUNE-REVIEW

It could have, and in many respects should have, gone down as the greatest comeback victory in the Steelers' illustrious playoff history.

Instead, it'll be remembered forever as the most difficult postseason loss to swallow since Super Bowl XXX.

The culprits are many, from the special teams (again), to the failure of the defense to protect a late-game lead (again), to quarterback Ben Roethlisberger's resurrection of the Kordell Stewart playoff hat trick (three interceptions and a lost fumble).

Still, the special teams were what they'd been all season, the defense at least didn't get run over repeatedly this time, and Roethlisberger was able to overcome his awful first half with an inspired final two quarters.

What really killed the Steelers was head coach Mike Tomlin's inexplicable decision to go for two after the touchdown that cut Jacksonville's lead to 28-23 with 10:25 left in the fourth quarter.

The initial try for two -- a pass to Hines Ward that was negated by a holding penalty on Sean Mahan -- was curious.

The subsequent re-try from the 12-yard line was amateurish.

Had the Steelers simply kicked to make it 28-24, they'd have kicked again at what would have been 30-28 following the Najeh Davenport TD with 6:21 to play.

Had that been the case, they might still be playing.

Amazingly, Tomlin considered such questionable decision-making a non-issue following what turned into a gut-wrenching 31-29 defeat.

"It was insignificant if we got the one (point)," Tomlin said. "We're playing the charts. That's not out of bounds; that's just baseball. Everybody's got that chart."

The "chart" to which Tomlin referred has often been vaguely referenced by NFL coaches since the NFL adopted the two-point conversion.

Someone, somewhere apparently came up with a chart that informs those in charge when it is and isn't appropriate to go for two.

Here's a better idea: do the math.

At 28-24, with over 10 minutes to play, the Steelers would still have been within a touchdown of taking a three-point lead.

And had they done that, a field goal wouldn't have been enough to beat them.

Tomlin got caught up in the emotion of the moment.

It was a fatal mistake.

It was also one Tomlin refused to acknowledge.

"If I had a crystal ball, and I knew we would lose by two, I probably would have kicked the extra point, if that makes you feel good," he said.

One season into his new gig, Tomlin isn't as accomplished at accepting responsibility as his quarterback, who, predictably and inaccurately, blamed himself.

As he grows into the job, Tomlin, hopefully, will be a little more poised.

The Steelers' players didn't hold it against him.

One even applauded the head coach's aggressiveness and the faith he displayed in his offense.

Still, there's a time to be aggressive and a time to play the percentages.

Tomlin needs to understand as much.

Or maybe get himself a different chart.


Mike Prisuta is a columnist for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. He can be reached at mprisuta@tribweb.com or 412-320-7923.